Some Considerations in Optimizing the Medical Physics Match by Butler, Richard V. et al.
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Economics Faculty Research Economics Department 
10-2019 
Some Considerations in Optimizing the Medical Physics Match 
Richard V. Butler 
Trinity University, rbutler@trinity.edu 
John H. Huston 
Trinity University, JHUSTON@TRINITY.EDU 
G. Starkschall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/econ_faculty 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Repository Citation 
Butler, R.V., Huston, J., & Starkschall, G. (2019). Some considerations in optimizing the medical physics 
match. Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, 20(10), 4-5. doi:10.1002/acm2.12732 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons 
@ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
E D I T O R I A L
Some considerations in optimizing the Medical Physics Match
For several years, many medical physics educational programs in the
United States and Canada have been participating in a residency
application matching program (MedPhys Match) in assigning gradu-
ates of CAMPEP‐accredited graduate programs to residency pro-
grams. Patterned after the National Resident Matching Program (The
Match) for medical school graduates, the MedPhys Match is
designed to maximize the satisfaction of the residency selection pro-
cess for both the residency candidate and the residency program.
Originally developed by Roth,1 the match algorithm requires the
residency candidate to rank order residency programs and the resi-
dency programs to rank order residency candidates. The match algo-
rithm then tries to combine the highest ranking candidate with
highest ranking program. In 1962, Gale and Shapley demonstrated
that this algorithm will always provide a stable solution.2 In 2012,
Roth and Shapley were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for
the matching algorithm.
Several problems have arisen in the application of this algorithm to
the MedPhys Match. One problem is that the number of residents
entering any given program is small. In 2018, a mean of 1.4 applicants
per program began residency training.3 A second problem is the imbal-
ance between the number of graduates applying to residency pro-
grams and the number of residency positions. In 2018, 79% of
graduates of CAMPEP‐accredited graduate programs were accepted
into residency programs.4 Consequently, to ensure a match, candi-
dates interview at many programs. There is also a harmful feedback
mechanism here. As applicants apply to more programs, the accep-
tance rate at each program declines. Consequently, applicants may
apply to even more programs to increase their perceived probability of
acceptance into a program. This is costly for the candidates in terms of
travel expenses, and costly for the interviewing faculty in terms of
time away from research, clinic, and teaching.
The problem, then, that must be solved is to determine the optimal
number of programs to which a prospective residency candidate
should apply. On one hand, applying to very few programs is desirable
because of the lower travel cost, but undesirable because of the lower
probability of being matched. On the other hand, applying to a large
number of programs is undesirable because of the increased cost, but
desirable because of the higher probability of being matched. The
solution to this problem is not easy to find since the solution is likely
to be candidate‐specific. The purpose of this paper is to present some
factors that need to be taken into account in achieving a solution.
Fundamentally, finding an applicant's optimal number of applica-
tions is a straightforward constrained maximization problem, in
which the applicant compares the benefits and costs of additional
applications subject to a budget constraint. The search should stop
when the marginal benefit of an additional application equals the
marginal cost (since we would expect the marginal benefit to be
declining and the marginal cost rising as a function of the number of
applications). Presumably applicants would have a pretty decent
sense of what their cost function looks like; the challenge would be
in quantifying the benefit function since it is probabilistic. The mar-
ginal benefit of applying to the applicant's nth program is a function
of the probability of getting a match with that program. As n rises, it
is more and more likely that a match would already been achieved
with a higher ranked program and thus the probability of a match
with the nth program falls. The proof of this is as follows:
Imagine a list of possible residencies with the first being the stu-
dent's favorite and the last being his/her least favorite. pi is the prob-
ability of matching the ith residency on a student's list given that the
student did not match with any his/her i‐1 other possible residencies.
So for the second residency, the probability of a match, Pi, is the
probability of not matching with the first residency times the proba-
bility of matching the second P2 = (1 − p1)p2. For a student consid-
ering interviewing with the ith residency on the list the probability
of matching is:
Pi ¼ 1 p1ð Þ 1 p2ð Þ 1 p3ð Þ . . . . . . 1 pi1ð Þpi
Each of those terms is a fraction less than one, so as i rises, the
probability of matching falls. Since the student's list is organized in
order of preference, the benefit of the ith position is also falls as i
increases. So the expected marginal benefit PiBi declines as the stu-
dent interviews with additional residencies.
In recent times, the advent of electronic applications and online
job‐matching platforms has lowered the marginal cost of applying
almost to zero. This has led to huge increases in the number of
applicants that hiring universities must review. For example, in 2005
a faculty vacancy in the Department of Economics at Trinity Univer-
sity attracted 64 applicants for that position. Last year the Depart-
ment had 536 candidates apply. Because it is impossible for a hiring
committee to give careful consideration to that many applicants,
institutions are looking for ways to reduce the flood by, in effect,
raising the marginal cost of applying. This can be accomplished by,
for example, requiring candidates to provide answers to questions
unique to that position. That seems to have helped a little. However,
if the number of medical physics graduates seeking residencies is
small, this may not be a useful solution.
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Because the problem of optimal applications is an economics
problem, there has been a search for solutions and a developing lit-
erature on the subject. Balter et al.5 show that limiting the number
of applications candidates can submit is superior to limiting the num-
ber of applications a program can evaluate. Entering an application
limit into the Gale/Shapley algorithm that underlies the matching
process, the authors conclude that "the optimal limit in the number
of applications balances the tradeoff between being unmatched and
gaining a better match in the aggregate, and the benefit can be con-
siderable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not
very correlated." In other words, limiting the number of applications
can actually result in better outcomes for the applicants as well as
the lower costs for the institutions. One way to possibly identify
that limit is to take a sample of a few years' residency markets and
determine how far down their list the lower‐ranked candidates had
to go to get a match. Presumably, interviews beyond that point are
very likely to have negative net benefits.
Another approach to a solution is "signaling." A program would
be permitted to notify a small number (somewhere between three
and five) of applicants prior to interviews that it is seriously inter-
ested in them. This gives the applicant useful information about his/
her chances at that particular program and so makes the benefit
function a bit less fuzzy. Because the problem in medical physics
seems to be more at the interview stage than the initial application
stage, some form of signaling by institutions offering residencies
might help reduce uncertainty so that at least some applicants could
focus on the places where they have good chance and pass on visits
to some of their more marginal options.
In conclusion, the problem of optimizing the number of residency
programs to which a medical physics graduate should apply is a cost‐
benefit problem. The incremental cost of applying to an additional pro-
gram is essentially the cost of travel to that program for an interview;
the benefit has yet to be quantified. Strategies for mitigating the cost
of a large number of applications include limiting the number of pro-
grams to which a candidate may apply and/or allowing programs to
notify candidates if they are seriously interested in them.
Dr Starkschall is Executive Secretary of the Commission on
Accreditation of Medical Physics Education Programs (CAMPEP).
The opinions expressed in this article are his, and do not represent
any official position of CAMPEP.
The Medical Physics Match has proven its usefulness to the
AAPM community, but it is not universally utilized for a variety of
reasons.
This invited guest editorial explores the scholarly history of the
match algorithm and suggests some avenues to optimize its future
use. It represents a first for these pages as some of its authors are
professional economists while all are accomplished scholars. Michael
D. Mills, Editor‐in‐Chief.
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